/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Password and authentication handling Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2009 Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003 Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005-2010 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "includes.h" #include "system/time.h" #include #include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h" #include "libcli/security/security.h" #include "auth/auth.h" #include "../libcli/auth/ntlm_check.h" #include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h" #include "auth/auth_sam.h" #include "dsdb/gmsa/util.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.h" #include "dsdb/common/util.h" #include "param/param.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind_c.h" #include "lib/crypto/gkdi.h" #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h" #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" #include "libds/common/roles.h" #include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" #include "system/kerberos.h" #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" #include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h" #include "kdc/db-glue.h" #undef DBGC_CLASS #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void); extern const char *user_attrs[]; extern const char *domain_ref_attrs[]; /**************************************************************************** Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and the lanman and NT responses. ****************************************************************************/ static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth4_context *auth_context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct samr_Password *nt_pwd, struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context, const DATA_BLOB *stored_aes_256_key, const krb5_data *salt, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key) { NTSTATUS status; switch (user_info->password_state) { case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: { const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp; if (nt_pwd == NULL && stored_aes_256_key != NULL && user_info->password.plaintext != NULL) { bool pw_equal; int krb5_ret; DATA_BLOB supplied_aes_256_key; krb5_keyblock key; krb5_data cleartext_data = { .data = user_info->password.plaintext, .length = strlen(user_info->password.plaintext) }; *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; krb5_ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, NULL, salt, &cleartext_data, ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, &key); if (krb5_ret) { DBG_ERR("generation of a aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 key for password comparison failed: %s\n", smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, krb5_ret, mem_ctx)); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } supplied_aes_256_key = data_blob_const(KRB5_KEY_DATA(&key), KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&key)); pw_equal = data_blob_equal_const_time(&supplied_aes_256_key, stored_aes_256_key); krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key); if (!pw_equal) { return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } return NT_STATUS_OK; } status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context, AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, user_info, &user_info_temp); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(1, ("Failed to convert plaintext password to password HASH: %s\n", nt_errstr(status))); return status; } user_info = user_info_temp; FALL_THROUGH; } case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH: *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); status = hash_password_check(mem_ctx, false, lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), NULL, user_info->password.hash.nt, user_info->mapped.account_name, NULL, nt_pwd); NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); break; case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE: status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx, false, lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx), user_info->logon_parameters, &auth_context->challenge.data, &user_info->password.response.lanman, &user_info->password.response.nt, user_info->mapped.account_name, user_info->client.account_name, user_info->client.domain_name, NULL, nt_pwd, user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); break; } return NT_STATUS_OK; } static void auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, struct tevent_context *event_ctx, struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam) { struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; struct winbind_SendToSam r; struct tevent_req *req; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return; } irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, "winbind_server", &ndr_table_winbind); if (irpc_handle == NULL) { DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for winbind\n")); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return; } r.in.message = *send_to_sam; /* * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, * which delivers the message in the _send function. * * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! */ req = dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(tmp_ctx, event_ctx, irpc_handle, &r); /* we aren't interested in a reply */ talloc_free(req); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); } /* send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets */ static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx, struct tevent_context *event_ctx, struct ldb_dn *user_dn) { struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle; struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r; struct tevent_req *req; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return; } irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx, "dreplsrv", &ndr_table_irpc); if (irpc_handle == NULL) { DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n")); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return; } r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn); /* * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation, * which delivers the message in the _send function. * * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register * a callback and wait for it to be triggered! */ req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx, event_ctx, irpc_handle, &r); /* we aren't interested in a reply */ talloc_free(req); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); } static const struct samr_Password *hide_invalid_nthash(const struct samr_Password *in) { /* * This is the result of: * * E_md4hash("", zero_string_hash.hash); */ static const struct samr_Password zero_string_hash = { .hash = { 0x31, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc0, } }; if (in == NULL) { return NULL; } /* * Skip over any all-zero hashes in the history. No known software * stores these but just to be sure */ if (all_zero(in->hash, sizeof(in->hash))) { return NULL; } /* * This looks odd, but the password_hash module in the past has written * this in the rare situation where (somehow) we didn't have an old NT * hash (one of the old LM-only set paths) * * mem_equal_const_time() is used to avoid a timing attack * when comparing secret data in the server with this constant * value. */ if (mem_equal_const_time(in->hash, zero_string_hash.hash, 16)) { in = NULL; } return in; } /* * Check that a password is OK, and update badPwdCount if required. */ static NTSTATUS authsam_password_check_and_record(struct auth4_context *auth_context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, struct ldb_message *msg, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, bool *authoritative) { NTSTATUS nt_status; NTSTATUS auth_status; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; int i, ret; int history_len = 0; struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx; const char * const attrs[] = { "pwdHistoryLength", NULL }; struct ldb_message *dom_msg; struct samr_Password *nt_pwd; DATA_BLOB _aes_256_key = data_blob_null; DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key = NULL; krb5_data _salt = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; krb5_data *salt = NULL; DATA_BLOB salt_data = data_blob_null; struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context = NULL; const struct ldb_val *sc_val; uint32_t userAccountControl = 0; uint32_t current_kvno = 0; bool am_rodc; NTTIME now; bool time_ok; time_ok = dsdb_gmsa_current_time(sam_ctx, &now); if (!time_ok) { return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* * This call does more than what it appears to do, it also * checks for the account lockout. * * It is done here so that all parts of Samba that read the * password refuse to even operate on it if the account is * locked out, to avoid mistakes like CVE-2013-4496. */ nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, msg, &nt_pwd); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0); sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); if (nt_pwd == NULL && sc_val == NULL) { if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { /* * we don't have passwords for this * account. We are an RODC, and this account * may be one for which we either are denied * REPL_SECRET replication or we haven't yet * done the replication. We return * NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which tells the * auth code to try the next authentication * mechanism. We also send a message to our * drepl server to tell it to try and * replicate the secrets for this account. * * TODO: Should we only trigger this is detected * there's a chance that the password might be * replicated, we should be able to detect this * based on msDS-NeverRevealGroup. */ auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(auth_context, auth_context->msg_ctx, auth_context->event_ctx, msg->dn); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } } /* * If we don't have an NT password, pull a kerberos key * instead for plaintext. */ if (nt_pwd == NULL && sc_val != NULL && user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN) { krb5_error_code krb5_ret; krb5_ret = smb_krb5_init_context(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, &smb_krb5_context); if (krb5_ret != 0) { DBG_ERR("Failed to setup krb5_context: %s!\n", error_message(krb5_ret)); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* * Get the current salt from the record */ krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, msg, userAccountControl, NULL, /* kvno */ ¤t_kvno, /* kvno_out */ &_aes_256_key, &salt_data); if (krb5_ret == 0) { aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; _salt.length = salt_data.length; salt = &_salt; } } auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx, nt_pwd, smb_krb5_context, aes_256_key, salt, user_info, user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { if (user_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); } if (lm_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); } TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_OK; } *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(auth_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return auth_status; } /* * We only continue if this was a wrong password and we'll * return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD in most cases, except for a * (default) 60 min grace period for previous NTLM password */ /* pull the domain password property attributes */ ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &dom_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, attrs, 0, "objectClass=domain"); if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) { history_len = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(dom_msg, "pwdHistoryLength", 0); } else if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find domain %s: %s!\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); } else { DEBUG(3,("error finding domain %s: %s!\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn), ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); } for (i = 1; i < MIN(history_len, 3); i++) { const struct samr_Password *nt_history_pwd = NULL; NTTIME pwdLastSet; int allowed_period_mins; NTTIME allowed_period; bool is_gmsa; /* Reset these variables back to starting as empty */ aes_256_key = NULL; salt = NULL; /* * Obtain the i'th old password from the NT password * history for this user. * * We avoid issues with salts (which are not * recorded for historical AES256 keys) by using the * ntPwdHistory in preference. */ nt_status = samdb_result_passwords_from_history(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, msg, i, NULL, &nt_history_pwd); /* * Belts and braces: note that * samdb_result_passwords_from_history() currently * does not fail for missing attributes, it only sets * nt_history_pwd = NULL, so "break" and fall down to * the bad password count update if this happens */ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { break; } nt_history_pwd = hide_invalid_nthash(nt_history_pwd); /* * We don't have an NT hash from the * ntPwdHistory, but we can still perform the * password check with the AES256 * key. * * However, this is the second preference as * it will fail if the account was renamed * prior to a password change (as we won't * have the correct salt available to * calculate the AES256 key). */ if (nt_history_pwd == NULL && sc_val != NULL && user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN && current_kvno >= i) { krb5_error_code krb5_ret; const uint32_t request_kvno = current_kvno - i; /* * Confirm we have a krb5_context set up */ if (smb_krb5_context == NULL) { /* * We get here if we had a unicodePwd * for the current password, no * ntPwdHistory, a valid previous * Kerberos history AND are processing * a simple bind. * * This really is a corner case so * favour cleaner code over trying to * allow for an old password. It is * more likely this is just a new * account. * * "break" out of the loop and fall down * to the bad password update */ break; } /* * Get the current salt from the record */ krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, msg, userAccountControl, &request_kvno, /* kvno */ NULL, /* kvno_out */ &_aes_256_key, &salt_data); if (krb5_ret != 0) { break; } aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key; _salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data; _salt.length = salt_data.length; salt = &_salt; } else if (nt_history_pwd == NULL) { /* * If we don't find element 'i' in the * ntPwdHistory and can not fall back to the * kerberos hash, we won't find 'i+1' ... */ break; } auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx, nt_history_pwd, smb_krb5_context, aes_256_key, salt, user_info, user_sess_key, lm_sess_key); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) { /* * If this was not a correct password, try the next * one from the history */ *user_sess_key = data_blob_null; *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null; continue; } if (i != 1) { /* * The authentication was OK, but not against * the previous password, which is stored at index 1. * * We just return the original wrong password. * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, * because this is almost certainly user error * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached * password from before the password change), * not an attack. */ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { /* * The authentication was OK against the previous password, * but it's not a NTLM network authentication, * LDAP simple bind or something similar. * * We just return the original wrong password. * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, * because this is almost certainly user error * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached * password from before the password change), * not an attack. */ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } /* * If the password was OK, it's a NTLM network authentication * and it was the previous password. * * Now we see if it is within the grace period, * so that we don't break cached sessions on other computers * before the user can lock and unlock their other screens * (resetting their cached password). * */ /* Is the account a Group Managed Service Account? */ is_gmsa = dsdb_account_is_gmsa(sam_ctx, msg); if (is_gmsa) { /* * For Group Managed Service Accounts, the previous * password is allowed for five minutes after a password * change. */ allowed_period_mins = gkdi_max_clock_skew_mins; } else { /* * See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/906305 * OldPasswordAllowedPeriod ("old password allowed * period") is specified in minutes. The default is 60. */ allowed_period_mins = lpcfg_old_password_allowed_period( auth_context->lp_ctx); } /* * NTTIME uses 100ns units */ allowed_period = (NTTIME) allowed_period_mins * 60 * 1000*1000*10; pwdLastSet = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "pwdLastSet", 0); if (now < pwdLastSet) { /* * time jump? * * We just return the original wrong password. * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, * because this is almost certainly user error * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached * password from before the password change), * not an attack. */ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } if ((now - pwdLastSet) >= allowed_period) { /* * The allowed period is over. * * We just return the original wrong password. * This skips the update of the bad pwd count, * because this is almost certainly user error * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached * password from before the password change), * not an attack. */ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } /* * We finally allow the authentication with the * previous password within the allowed period. */ if (user_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); } if (lm_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); } TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return auth_status; } /* * If we are not in the allowed period or match an old password, * we didn't return early. Now update the badPwdCount et al. */ nt_status = authsam_update_bad_pwd_count(auth_context->sam_ctx, msg, domain_dn); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { /* * We need to return the original * NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD error, so there isn't * anything more we can do than write something into * the log */ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to note bad password for user [%s]: %s\n", user_info->mapped.account_name, nt_errstr(nt_status))); } if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) { *authoritative = false; } TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { nt_status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; } return nt_status; } static NTSTATUS authsam_check_netlogon_trust(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *sam_ctx, struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out) { TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL; static const char *authn_policy_silo_attrs[] = { "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicy", "msDS-AssignedAuthNPolicySilo", "objectClass", /* used to determine which set of policy * attributes apply. */ NULL, }; const struct authn_server_policy *authn_server_policy = NULL; struct dom_sid_buf netlogon_trust_sid_buf; const char *netlogon_trust_sid_str = NULL; struct ldb_dn *netlogon_trust_dn = NULL; struct ldb_message *netlogon_trust_msg = NULL; int ret; /* Have we established a secure channel? */ if (user_info->netlogon_trust_account.secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_NULL) { return NT_STATUS_OK; } if (!authn_policy_silos_and_policies_in_effect(sam_ctx)) { return NT_STATUS_OK; } /* * We have established a secure channel, and we should have the machine * account’s SID. */ SMB_ASSERT(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid != NULL); tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } netlogon_trust_sid_str = dom_sid_str_buf(user_info->netlogon_trust_account.sid, &netlogon_trust_sid_buf); netlogon_trust_dn = ldb_dn_new_fmt(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, "", netlogon_trust_sid_str); if (netlogon_trust_dn == NULL) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* * Look up the machine account to see if it has an applicable * authentication policy. */ ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &netlogon_trust_msg, netlogon_trust_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, authn_policy_silo_attrs, 0, NULL); if (ret) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return dsdb_ldb_err_to_ntstatus(ret); } ret = authn_policy_server(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, netlogon_trust_msg, &authn_server_policy); if (ret) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (authn_server_policy != NULL) { struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; NTSTATUS status; /* * An authentication policy applies to the machine * account. Carry out the access check. */ status = authn_policy_authenticate_to_service(tmp_ctx, sam_ctx, lp_ctx, AUTHN_POLICY_AUTH_TYPE_NTLM, user_info_dc, NULL /* device_info */, /* * It seems that claims go ignored for * SamLogon (see SamLogonTests — * test_samlogon_allowed_to_computer_silo). */ (struct auth_claims) {}, authn_server_policy, (struct authn_policy_flags) {}, &server_audit_info); if (server_audit_info != NULL) { *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); } if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return status; } } return NT_STATUS_OK; } static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth4_context *auth_context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_dn *domain_dn, struct ldb_message *msg, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc, DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key, struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, bool *authoritative) { NTSTATUS nt_status; int ret; bool interactive = (user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH); uint32_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(msg, NULL); struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam = NULL; const struct authn_ntlm_client_policy *authn_client_policy = NULL; struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL; NTTIME now; bool time_ok; time_ok = dsdb_gmsa_current_time(sam_ctx, &now); if (!time_ok) { return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (!tmp_ctx) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* You can only do an interactive login to normal accounts */ if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) { if (!(acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; } if (acct_flags & ACB_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { if (acct_flags & ACB_DISABLED) { DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " "was disabled.\n", user_info->mapped.account_name)); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED; } DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' " "requires interactive smartcard logon.\n", user_info->mapped.account_name)); TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_SMARTCARD_LOGON_REQUIRED; } } /* See whether an authentication policy applies to the client. */ ret = authn_policy_ntlm_client(auth_context->sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, msg, &authn_client_policy); if (ret) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } nt_status = authn_policy_ntlm_apply_device_restriction(mem_ctx, authn_client_policy, client_audit_info_out); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { /* * As we didn’t get far enough to check the server policy, only * the client policy will be referenced in the authentication * log message. */ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } nt_status = authsam_password_check_and_record(auth_context, tmp_ctx, domain_dn, msg, user_info, user_sess_key, lm_sess_key, authoritative); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } nt_status = authsam_check_netlogon_trust(mem_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx, user_info, user_info_dc, server_audit_info_out); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx, now, user_info->logon_parameters, domain_dn, msg, user_info->workstation_name, user_info->mapped.account_name, false, false); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } nt_status = authsam_logon_success_accounting(auth_context->sam_ctx, msg, domain_dn, interactive, tmp_ctx, &send_to_sam); if (send_to_sam != NULL) { auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(tmp_ctx, auth_context->msg_ctx, auth_context->event_ctx, send_to_sam); } if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data); } if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) { talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data); } TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_internals(struct auth_method_context *ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc, struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info_out, struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info_out, bool *authoritative) { NTSTATUS nt_status; int result; const char *account_name = user_info->mapped.account_name; struct ldb_message *msg; struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; const char *p = NULL; struct auth_user_info_dc *reparented = NULL; struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info = NULL; struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL; if (ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx == NULL) { DEBUG(0, ("No SAM available, cannot log in users\n")); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; } if (!account_name || !*account_name) { /* 'not for me' */ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (!tmp_ctx) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx); if (domain_dn == NULL) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN; } /* * If we have not already mapped this user, then now is a good * time to do so, before we look it up. We used to do this * earlier, but in a multi-forest environment we want to do * this mapping at the final domain. * * However, on the flip side we may have already mapped the * user if this was an LDAP simple bind, in which case we * really, really want to get back to exactly the same account * we got the DN for. */ if (!user_info->cracknames_called) { p = strchr_m(account_name, '@'); } else { /* * This is slightly nicer than double-indenting the * block below */ p = NULL; } if (p != NULL) { const char *nt4_domain = NULL; const char *nt4_account = NULL; bool is_my_domain = false; nt_status = crack_name_to_nt4_name(mem_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, /* * DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_UPN_FOR_LOGON ? */ DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL, account_name, &nt4_domain, &nt4_account); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; } is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, nt4_domain); if (!is_my_domain) { /* * This is a user within our forest, * but in a different domain, * we're not authoritative */ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } /* * Let's use the NT4 account name for the lookup. */ account_name = nt4_account; } nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, account_name, domain_dn, &msg); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), lpcfg_sam_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), lpcfg_sam_dnsname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx), domain_dn, msg, data_blob_null, data_blob_null, user_info_dc); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } result = dsdb_is_protected_user(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, (*user_info_dc)->sids, (*user_info_dc)->num_sids); /* * We also consider an error result (a negative value) as denying the * authentication. */ if (result != 0) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION; } nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, tmp_ctx, domain_dn, msg, user_info, *user_info_dc, &user_sess_key, &lm_sess_key, &client_audit_info, &server_audit_info, authoritative); if (client_audit_info != NULL) { *client_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &client_audit_info); } if (server_audit_info != NULL) { *server_audit_info_out = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &server_audit_info); } if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } (*user_info_dc)->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, user_sess_key.data, user_sess_key.length); if (user_sess_key.data) { if ((*user_info_dc)->user_session_key.data == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } } (*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc, lm_sess_key.data, lm_sess_key.length); if (lm_sess_key.data) { if ((*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key.data == NULL) { TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } } /* * Release our handle to *user_info_dc. {client,server}_audit_info_out, * if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. */ reparented = talloc_reparent(tmp_ctx, mem_ctx, *user_info_dc); if (reparented == NULL) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_OK; } struct authsam_check_password_state { struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info; struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info; bool authoritative; }; static struct tevent_req *authsam_check_password_send( TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct tevent_context *ev, struct auth_method_context *ctx, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) { struct tevent_req *req = NULL; struct authsam_check_password_state *state = NULL; NTSTATUS status; req = tevent_req_create( mem_ctx, &state, struct authsam_check_password_state); if (req == NULL) { return NULL; } /* * authsam_check_password_internals() sets this to false in * the rodc case, otherwise it leaves it untouched. Default to * "we're authoritative". */ state->authoritative = true; status = authsam_check_password_internals( ctx, state, user_info, &state->user_info_dc, &state->client_audit_info, &state->server_audit_info, &state->authoritative); if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { return tevent_req_post(req, ev); } tevent_req_done(req); return tevent_req_post(req, ev); } static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_recv( struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info, const struct authn_audit_info **client_audit_info, const struct authn_audit_info **server_audit_info, bool *authoritative) { struct authsam_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data( req, struct authsam_check_password_state); NTSTATUS status; *authoritative = state->authoritative; *client_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->client_audit_info); state->client_audit_info = NULL; *server_audit_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->server_audit_info); state->server_audit_info = NULL; if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) { tevent_req_received(req); return status; } /* * Release our handle to state->user_info_dc. * {client,server}_audit_info, if non-NULL, becomes the new parent. */ *interim_info = talloc_reparent(state, mem_ctx, state->user_info_dc); state->user_info_dc = NULL; tevent_req_received(req); return NT_STATUS_OK; } static NTSTATUS authsam_ignoredomain_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) { if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } return NT_STATUS_OK; } /**************************************************************************** Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks. ****************************************************************************/ static NTSTATUS authsam_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info) { const char *effective_domain = user_info->mapped.domain_name; bool is_local_name = false; bool is_my_domain = false; const char *p = NULL; struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL; const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL; NTSTATUS status; if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) { return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } if (effective_domain == NULL) { effective_domain = ""; } is_local_name = lpcfg_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, effective_domain); /* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */ switch (lpcfg_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) { case ROLE_STANDALONE: return NT_STATUS_OK; case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: if (is_local_name) { return NT_STATUS_OK; } DBG_DEBUG("%s is not one of my local names (DOMAIN_MEMBER)\n", effective_domain); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC: /* handled later */ break; default: DBG_ERR("lpcfg_server_role() has an undefined value\n"); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SERVER_STATE; } /* * Now we handle the AD DC case... */ is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, effective_domain); if (is_my_domain) { return NT_STATUS_OK; } if (user_info->cracknames_called) { /* * The caller already did a cracknames call. */ DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", effective_domain); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } if (!strequal(effective_domain, "")) { DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n", effective_domain); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } p = strchr_m(user_info->mapped.account_name, '@'); if (p == NULL) { /* * An empty to domain name should be handled * as the local domain name. */ return NT_STATUS_OK; } effective_domain = p + 1; is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, effective_domain); if (is_my_domain) { return NT_STATUS_OK; } if (strequal(effective_domain, "")) { DBG_DEBUG("authsam_check_password: upn without realm (DC)\n"); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } /* * as last option we check the routing table if the * domain is within our forest. */ status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, mem_ctx, &trt); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DBG_ERR("authsam_check_password: dsdb_trust_routing_table_load() %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); return status; } tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, effective_domain); if (tdo == NULL) { DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a known TLN (DC)\n", effective_domain); TALLOC_FREE(trt); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } if (!(tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)) { DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a TLN in our forest (DC)\n", effective_domain); TALLOC_FREE(trt); return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; } /* * This principal is within our forest. * we'll later do a crack_name_to_nt4_name() * to check if it's in our domain. */ TALLOC_FREE(trt); return NT_STATUS_OK; } static const struct auth_operations sam_ignoredomain_ops = { .name = "sam_ignoredomain", .want_check = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check, .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, }; static const struct auth_operations sam_ops = { .name = "sam", .want_check = authsam_want_check, .check_password_send = authsam_check_password_send, .check_password_recv = authsam_check_password_recv, }; _PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *); _PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) { NTSTATUS ret; ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ops); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam' auth backend!\n")); return ret; } ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ignoredomain_ops); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam_ignoredomain' auth backend!\n")); return ret; } return ret; }