/* * Copyright (c) 2019, The Android Open Source Project * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ #pragma once #include #include #include #include "aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h" #include #include namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov { using bytevec = std::vector; using namespace cppcose; extern bytevec kTestMacKey; // The Google root key for the Endpoint Encryption Key chain, encoded as COSE_Sign1 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedRootCert[] = { 0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x27, 0x20, 0x06, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xee, 0xdd, 0x5e, 0xe4, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x85, 0xc6, 0x4c, 0x62, 0xdc, 0x3e, 0x61, 0xab, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7d, 0x75, 0x37, 0x29, 0xad, 0x76, 0x80, 0x32, 0xd2, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd9, 0x58, 0x40, 0x1e, 0x22, 0x08, 0x4b, 0xa4, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0x4e, 0x03, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xb8, 0xaf, 0x14, 0x4c, 0xa7, 0x3b, 0x6f, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0xdc, 0xda, 0x79, 0xc6, 0x2b, 0x64, 0xfe, 0x99, 0x39, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x80, 0xfa, 0x66, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0d, 0x07, 0x98, 0x2a, 0xac, 0x91, 0x5c, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x14, 0x49, 0x06, 0x34, 0x75, 0xca, 0x8a, 0x27, 0x7a, 0xd9, 0xe3, 0x5a, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x02, 0x03}; // The Google Endpoint Encryption Key certificate, encoded as COSE_Sign1 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedGeekCert[] = { 0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x4e, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x58, 0x20, 0xd0, 0xae, 0xc1, 0x15, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xcf, 0x73, 0xae, 0x6b, 0xcc, 0xcb, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x1d, 0x65, 0xe8, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0x1a, 0x37, 0xb9, 0x43, 0x3a, 0x97, 0xd5, 0x99, 0xdf, 0x98, 0x08, 0x03, 0x38, 0x18, 0x20, 0x04, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0xbe, 0x85, 0xe7, 0x46, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x42, 0x5a, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x36, 0x3a, 0xa6, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x58, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0x33, 0x02, 0x32, 0xd2, 0xfc, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x25, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x60, 0x58, 0x40, 0x9b, 0xcf, 0x90, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xab, 0xd1, 0x18, 0xb1, 0x0e, 0x8e, 0x5d, 0x20, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x58, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x05, 0x83, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0x64, 0x78, 0x2d, 0x54, 0x10, 0x4b, 0xc0, 0x31, 0xbf, 0x6b, 0xe8, 0x1e, 0x35, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x2d, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x2f, 0x4f, 0xf2, 0xf5, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0xd4, 0x83, 0xad, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xf1, 0x87, 0x58, 0x04}; // The Google ECDSA P256 root key for the Endpoint Encryption Key chain, encoded as COSE_Sign1 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedEcdsa256RootCert[] = { 0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x26, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x26, 0x20, 0x01, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0xf7, 0x14, 0x8a, 0xdb, 0x97, 0xf4, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x64, 0x11, 0xc4, 0xe3, 0x75, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x1f, 0xa4, 0x71, 0x0c, 0x6c, 0xcf, 0xfa, 0x09, 0x46, 0x80, 0x74, 0x87, 0x54, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x22, 0x58, 0x20, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x5b, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x19, 0xcc, 0xff, 0x13, 0x37, 0xfd, 0x0f, 0xa1, 0xc8, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x76, 0xc4, 0x5d, 0xe6, 0xd7, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x58, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x97, 0x8e, 0x42, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0x07, 0x2d, 0x95, 0x47, 0x85, 0x47, 0x93, 0x40, 0xb0, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x47, 0xa4, 0xc4, 0x44, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xa1, 0x07, 0x87, 0x10, 0xc7, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0x11, 0xf4, 0xbf, 0x9f, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xe0, 0xe7, 0x34, 0x4c, 0x15, 0xfc, 0x7b, 0xc3, 0x7e, 0x33, 0x05, 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x34, 0x3c, 0xed, 0x02, 0x04, 0x60, 0x7a, 0x15, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0xff, 0x24}; // The Google ECDSA P256 Endpoint Encryption Key certificate, encoded as COSE_Sign1 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedEcdsa256GeekCert[] = { 0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x26, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x71, 0xa6, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x58, 0x20, 0x35, 0x73, 0xb7, 0x3f, 0xa0, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x89, 0xb1, 0x26, 0x67, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x75, 0xa1, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x61, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x03, 0x91, 0x3b, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x94, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x03, 0x38, 0x18, 0x20, 0x01, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0xe0, 0x41, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x41, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xd7, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x55, 0x35, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x6a, 0x47, 0x13, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0x48, 0x96, 0x7e, 0x24, 0x9c, 0x68, 0x22, 0x58, 0x20, 0x1f, 0xce, 0x45, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xba, 0x81, 0x21, 0xf9, 0xe5, 0x05, 0x9b, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x0e, 0x76, 0x86, 0x86, 0x47, 0xb8, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xce, 0xaf, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdb, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8c, 0xb3, 0xba, 0x7e, 0x20, 0x3e, 0x32, 0xb0, 0x68, 0xdf, 0x60, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf0, 0xac, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x51, 0xbc, 0xff, 0x6c, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x56, 0x78, 0xb3, 0x99, 0xd8, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xda, 0xb5, 0xb5, 0x7f, 0x71, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x6b, 0xdf, 0x33, 0x27, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x65, 0xd1, 0x2a, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x99, 0x98, 0xab, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x80, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x50}; /** * Generates random bytes. */ bytevec randomBytes(size_t numBytes); const std::string DEFAULT_INSTANCE_NAME = "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default"; const std::string RKPVM_INSTANCE_NAME = "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf"; /** * Returns the portion of an instance name after the / * e.g. for "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf", * it returns "avf". */ std::string_view deviceSuffix(std::string_view name); struct EekChain { bytevec chain; bytevec last_pubkey; bytevec last_privkey; }; /** * Based on the supportedEekCurve, Generates an X25519/ECDH with the specified eekId * and an Ed25519/ECDSA chain of the specified length. All keys are generated randomly. */ ErrMsgOr generateEekChain(int32_t supportedEekCurve, size_t length, const bytevec& eekId); /** * Returns the CBOR-encoded, production Google Endpoint Encryption Key chain. */ bytevec getProdEekChain(int32_t supportedEekCurve); struct BccEntryData { bytevec pubKey; }; struct JsonOutput { static JsonOutput Ok(std::string json) { return {std::move(json), ""}; } static JsonOutput Error(std::string error) { return {"", std::move(error)}; } std::string output; std::string error; // if non-empty, this describes what went wrong }; /** * Take a given instance name and certificate request, then output a JSON blob * containing the name, build fingerprint and certificate request. This data may * be serialized, then later uploaded to the remote provisioning service. The * input csr is not validated, only encoded. * * Output format: * { * "build_fingerprint": * "csr": * "name": * } */ JsonOutput jsonEncodeCsrWithBuild(const std::string& instance_name, const cppbor::Array& csr, const std::string& serialno_prop); /** * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to * ensure it contains the minimum required data at the time of manufacturing. This is only a * partial validation, as some fields may not be provisioned yet at the time this information * is parsed in the manufacturing process. */ ErrMsgOr> parseAndValidateFactoryDeviceInfo( const std::vector& deviceInfoBytes, const RpcHardwareInfo& info); /** * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to * ensure it is formatted correctly and that it contains the required values for Remote Key * Provisioning. This is a full validation, and assumes the device is provisioned as if it is * suitable for the end user. */ ErrMsgOr> parseAndValidateProductionDeviceInfo( const std::vector& deviceInfoBytes, const RpcHardwareInfo& info); /** * Verify the protected data as if the device is still early in the factory process and may not * have all device identifiers provisioned yet. */ ErrMsgOr> verifyFactoryProtectedData( const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign, const std::vector& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData, const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector& eekId, const RpcHardwareInfo& info, const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector& challenge); /** * Verify the protected data as if the device is a final production sample. */ ErrMsgOr> verifyProductionProtectedData( const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign, const std::vector& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData, const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector& eekId, const RpcHardwareInfo& info, const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector& challenge, bool allowAnyMode = false); /** * Verify the CSR as if the device is still early in the factory process and may not * have all device identifiers provisioned yet. */ ErrMsgOr> verifyFactoryCsr(const cppbor::Array& keysToSign, const std::vector& csr, const RpcHardwareInfo& info, const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector& challenge, bool allowDegenerate = true, bool requireUdsCerts = false); /** * Verify the CSR as if the device is a final production sample. */ ErrMsgOr> verifyProductionCsr(const cppbor::Array& keysToSign, const std::vector& csr, const RpcHardwareInfo& info, const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector& challenge, bool allowAnyMode = false); /** Checks whether the CSR has a proper DICE chain. */ ErrMsgOr isCsrWithProperDiceChain(const std::vector& csr, const std::string& instanceName); /** Verify the DICE chain. */ ErrMsgOr> validateBcc(const cppbor::Array* bcc, hwtrust::DiceChain::Kind kind, bool allowAnyMode, bool allowDegenerate, const std::string& instanceName); } // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov